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FRONT-END LOADED TENDER OFFERS: THE
APPLICATION OF FEDERAL AND STATE LAW TO AN
INNOVATIVE CORPORATE ACQUISITION TECHNIQUE
A major tactical development in the corporate takeover world has
been the emergence and refinement of the front-end loaded, two-step
tender offer.' The tactic involves a single offer to acquire 100% control
of a target corporation in two steps. In the first step the offeror ac-
quires, usually for cash, some of the target company's shares.' In the
second step, the offeror acquires the remainder of the target's shares in
exchange for securities worth less than the cash paid in the first step.3
The front-end loaded tender offer, or, as it is often called, the two-
tiered tender offer, is an extremely strong and attractive acquisition
technique for two reasons. First, it increases the offeror's prospects for
success because it prompts many target company shareholders to tender
their stock quickly, before expiration of the first-step cash offer,4 and
before the target can consolidate its defenses. Second, the two-tiered of-
fer for 100% control is less expensive than a partial tender offer for
control (with no mention of a second step) with the acquiror later de-
ciding to acquire the remainder of the outstanding shares.3
1 The major significance of this tactical development and the use of the colorful "front-end
loaded" terminology is suggested in Fleischer, Sun Shines on Bidders in Corporate Takeover
World, Legal Times of Wash., Jan. 25, 1982, at 15, col. 1.
This controversial new acquisition tactic was employed in the past two years by DuPont Co.
in its successful bid for Conoco Inc., by U.S. Steel Corp. and Mobil Corp. in their bidding war for
Marathon Oil Co., and by Martin Marietta in its bid for Bendix. See Wall St. J., May 14, 1982,
at 4, col. 1; id., Aug. 31, 1982, at 3, col. 1.
2 Fleischer, supra note 1, at 15, col. 1.
3Id.
' See infra notes 53-56 and accompanying text.
Acquiring companies normally pay a substantial premium over market price in a tender
offer for control of a target corporation. See infra notes 102-06 and accompanying text. After
obtaining control, the remaining outstanding shares typically sell for substantially more than the
market price prevailing prior to the tender offer, though less than the amount offered in the tender
offer. See infra note 107 and accompanying text. Assuming this new price plateau is indicative of
some lasting and fundamental value the market attaches to a company in the hands of a new
controlling shareholder, such plateau will support any future tender offer or merger agreement.
Should the acquiring company later decide to acquire the remaining outstanding shares through a
negotiated or non-negotiated merger, it may well have to pay a second premium over the then
prevailing market price. One commentator reports that among a group of 26 recent negotiated
acquisitions of minority shares by controlling shareholders, all but one were at a premium over
market value of at least 10%, and 85% were at a premium of at least 35%. Chazen, Fairness from
a Financial Point of View in Acquisition of Public Companies: Is "Third-Party Sale Value" the
Appropriate Standard?, 36 BUS. LAW. 1439, 1445 n.36 (1981). Reason suggests, then, that in
comparison to the cost of two separate transactions, both involving the payment of a premium, an
integrated, two-tiered tender offer, which sets the price of the second step merger at the time of the
first step tender offer, will succeed at a lower total cost to the acquiring corporation.
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Although advantageous for bidders, the two-tiered tender offer has
been harshly criticized and has sparked shareholder (and target) litiga-
tion. The principal allegation is that the two-tiered offer coerces un-
willing target shareholders to tender their shares in the first step (to
avoid forced acceptance of the lower valued second step), thereby effec-
tively preventing other potential offerors from bidding for the target.
This Comment will address the various concerns arising from use
of the two-tiered tender offer. Part I fully describes the two-tiered offer,
using the recent takeover of Marathon Oil Company as an example.
This part also identifies the problems encountered in each phase of the
transaction and discusses the separate concerns of the acquiring com-
pany, the target company, shareholders, and the Securities and Ex-
change Commission. Part II describes the federal laws governing tender
offers and analyzes claims that two-tiered tender offers violate such
laws. Although concluding that the two-tiered offer is a permitted ac-
quisition technique, this part offers a proposal for reform to ensure
shareholder protection as the technique evolves. Part III discusses
shareholders' state law claims and how such laws can be amended to
better address this new acquisiton technique.
I. THE Two-TIERED TENDER OFFER
The two-tiered tender offer is a fairly recent development in the
mergers and acquisitions field. Thus, it may be helpful to examine in
detail the course of one such event. The acquisition of Marathon Oil
Company nicely illustrates the intricacies of the two-tiered tender offer
as well as the concerns of the acquiring company, competing bidders,
target shareholders, and the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC or Commission).
A. Acquisition of Marathon
The Marathon Oil Company (Marathon), an Ohio corporation,
was a widely held public corporation engaged primarily in the produc-
tion, refining, and marketing of oil products." On October 30, 1981,
Mobil Oil Corporation (Mobil) announced an offer to acquire all of
the outstanding shares of Marathon.' In the first step, Mobil offered to
purchase up to 40 million of the then over 58.9 million outstanding
shares' of Marathon for $85 per share in cash.9 If it obtained majority
I Marathon Oil Co., Proxy Statement 56 (Feb. 8, 1982) [hereinafter cited as Proxy
Statement].
7 Id. at 8.
8 Id. at 6.
9 Id. at 8.
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control through this first step, Mobil then planned to gain complete
control through a second-step merger in which it would exchange debt
securities having a market value of $85 for each remaining share of
Marathon. On October 31, 1981, the directors of Marathon deter-
mined that the Mobil offer was "grossly inadequate," recommended
that the shareholders reject it," and quickly set out to find other corpo-
rations that might be interested in acquiring Marathon. Discussions be-
tween Marathon and the United States Steel Corpoi'ation (U.S. Steel)
began on November 9, 1981, while Mobil's tender offer remained open,
and the U.S. Steel offer was accepted by the Marathon directors on
November 18, 1981.2 The U.S. Steel offer was made public on No-
vember 19, 1981.13 Determined to provide a superior alternative to
Mobil's $85 per share offer, U.S. Steel proposed a two-step, two-tiered
offer. In the first step, U.S. Steel offered to pay $125 in cash for each of
30 million (about 51%) of Marathon's outstanding shares.1 4 In the sec-
ond step, U.S. Steel proposed to acquire all of the remaining outstand-
ing shares 5 in a merger between Marathon and a wholly owned sub-
sidiary of U.S. Steel whereby each share of Marathon stock would be
exchanged for $100 face value, 12 %, twelve-year debt securities of
U.S. Steel,' 6 having a market value of approximately $86'1 at the time
the offer was made.
Despite Mobil's efforts to enjoin U.S. Steel's acquisition of Mara-
thon18 and Mobil's subsequent revised offer (which was also in two-
tiered form 9 in response to U.S. Steel's two-tiered offer), over 53 mil-
10 Id.
"1 The several factors which the Marathon directors considered in reaching this condusion
are enumerated in id. at 8.
12 Id. at 9-11.
13 United States Steel Corporation, Offer to Purchase for Cash 30,000,000 Common Shares
of Marathon Oil Company at S125 Per Share Net (Nov. 19, 1981) [hereinafter cited as Offer to
Purchase].
14 Id. at 1.
15 The remaining outstanding shares included those tendered in the first step but not ac-
cepted because the offer was oversubscribed, as well as those not tendered.
16 Offer to Purchase, supra note 13, at 10.
17 See Wall St. J., Feb. 3, 1982, at 2, col. 3.
18 As part of the merger agreement between Marathon and U.S. Steel, Marathon granted to
U.S. Steel two options aimed at reducing competition over the acquisition of Marathon. Under the
agreement, U.S. Steel was granted an option to purchase from Marathon up to ten million Mara-
thon shares for $90 per share, and, more importantly, U.S. Steel was granted an option to
purchase Marathon's interest in the Yates oil field for $2.8 billion should another corporation
succeed in acquiring more than 50% of Marathon. Proxy Statement, supra note 6, at 10. These
so-called "lock-up" options were invalidated as a manipulative tender offer practice under § 14(e)
of the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1976). Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co.,
669 F.2d 366 (6th Cir. 1981). For further discussion of these lock-up options, see infra notes 60-
63 and accompanying text.
19 Proxy Statement, supra note 6, at 8.
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lion Marathon shares were tendered to U.S. Steel.2" U.S. Steel then
purchased 30 million of these shares-the number it sought in the first
step of the acquisition-and returned the remaining oversubscribed
shares.
Having acquired 51% of the outstanding shares of Marathon, U.S.
Steel, as promised in its tender offer announcement, 21 voted such shares
in favor of the proposed second-step merger.22 Despite a publicized
movement of shareholders against the terms of the merger,2" more than
the necessary number of remaining Marathon shares voted2" along with
U.S. Steel to meet the two-thirds majority required to approve the
merger.2 5 Thus, to complete the second step of the acquisition, the re-
maining 49% of Marathon shares were to be exchanged for the debt
securities of U.S. Steel.
B. Aftermath of Marathon and Concerns Raised by
Two-Tiered Tender Offers
To summarize: Mobil's October 30, 1981 tender offer was a two-
step, equal consideration proposal, offering $85 of consideration in each
step.26 U.S. Steel's November 19, 1981 tender offer was a two-step,
two-tiered offer, with $125 being offered in the first step and a debt
security with a fluctuating market value being offered in the second
step.2 7 Mobil's revised offer was also in two-tiered form, with $126
being offered in the first step and a debt security with a market value of
$90 being offered in the second step.
28
Mobil, in both its initial equal consideration offer and its subse-
quent revised two-tiered offer, disclosed the market value of its pro-
20 Radol v. Thomas, 534 F. Supp. 1302, 1305 (S.D. Ohio 1982).
2 Offer to Purchase, supra note 13, at 12.
'2 Wall St. J., Mar. 12, 1982, at 3, col. 2.
23 Wall St. J., Mar. 2, 1982, at 33, col. 4; id., Feb. 23, 1982, at 7, col. 1; id., Feb. 8, 1982, at
24, col. 2; id., Jan. 14, 1982, at 12, col. 1.
l' Id., Mar. 12, 1982, at 3, col. 2.
2 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.78(F) (Page 1978) (merger into domestic corporation) and
§ 1701.79(D) (Page Supp. 1981) (merger into foreign corporation). Had Marathon been a Dela-
ware corporation, U.S. Steel's 51% vote would have been sufficient by itself to approve the merger
and freeze out all remaining public shareholders. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251(c) (1975) (long
form merger requires majority of outstanding stock for approval).
26 See supra text accompanying notes 9-10.
" See supra text accompanying notes 14-15.
See supra text acccompanying note 19.
Both types of two-step offers-equal consideration and two-tiered-have been described as
"integrated," see Brudney & Chirelstein, A Restatement of Corporate Freezeouts, 87 YALE L.J.
1354, 1360 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Restatement], or "unitary," see Proxy Statement, supra
note 6, at 11 (this terminology was also used in the cover letter to this Proxy Statement), because
the terms of acquisition of all shares bought in both steps are embodied in a single plan and are
announced in regulated disclosure statements published before any shares are tendered.
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posed second-step debt securities. Mobil assumed the risk of interest
rate fluctuations by promising to structure the terms of the debt securi-
ties so as to achieve a stated market value. 9
U.S. Steel, on the other hand, by shifting the risk of interest rate
fluctuation to the Marathon shareholders, could not disclose the market
value of its second step debt securities.30 As it happened, rates fluctu-
ated with an adverse effect to shareholders. From the time U.S. Steel
announced its offer to the date it issued the debt securities four months
later, the market value of the second-step consideration dropped from
an estimated value of $86"l to an actual trading value of approximately
$78.32
Because of the deal's high stakes and the techniques used to imple-
ment it, the takeover of Marathon by U.S. Steel prompted several class
action suits by Marathon shareholders.3" The allegations implicated the
validity of the two-tiered, two-step takeover tactic, asserting: (a) that
the pricing of the second-step consideration amounted to a manipulative
act or practice under section 14(e) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934;34 (b) that U.S. Steel failed to disclose fully and fairly internal
valuations of Marathon's assets (including valuations of Marathon's
proven, probable, and possible oil reserves);3 5 and (c) that the second-
step merger served no legitimate business purpose, that the terms were
not entirely fair to minority shareholders, and that U.S. Steel violated
state law fiduciary duties by denying the minority shareholders their
right to share proportionately in the true value of Marathon.3 ' The
shareholder actions sought to enjoin or rescind the merger, and asked
for compensatory and punitive damages as well as other costs and fees.
None of the suits were successful in obtaining a preliminary injunction
to block the merger. After the second step merger was approved on
March 11, 1982, many of the dissenters invoked their remaining legal
29 See Proxy Statement, supra note 6, at 11.
" See Offer to Purchase, supra note 13, at 10.
31 See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
32 Wall St. J., Apr. 21, 1982, at 1, col. 6. Interest rates subsequently dropped and the value
of U.S. Steel debt securities has risen substantially.
3 See, e.g., Radol v. Thomas, 534 F. Supp. 1302 (S.D. Ohio 1982); Shecter v. United States
Steel Corp., No. 1-82-0047, (N.D. Ohio filed Jan. 29, 1982); Crossett Charitable Found. v.
United States Steel Corp., No. C-1-82-0031, (S.D. Ohio filed Jan. 19, 1982); Woods v. United
States Steel Corp., No. 82-31, (N.D. Ohio filed Jan. 18, 1982); Pryor v. United States Steel Corp.
(S.D.N.Y. filed Jan. 13, 1982); Wisehart v. United States Steel Corp., No. 6673, (Del. Ch. filed
Jan. 8, 1982); Starkman v. Marathon Oil Co., No. 11, (N.D. 11. filed Dec. 31, 1981).
" Radol v. Thomas, 534 F. Supp. 1302, 1311 (S.D. Ohio 1982); see also Proxy Statement,
supra note 6, at 15 (citing claims of manipulative acts raised in Woods v. United States Steel
Corp., No. 82-31 (N.D. Ohio filed Jan. 18, 1982)).
See, e.g., Complaint, Radol v. Thomas, 534 F. Supp. 1302 (S.D. Ohio 1982).
Id. at 14, 21.
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remedy, the state law statutory appraisal proceeding, 37 arguing that
they were entitled to fair cash value for their shares, a value exceeding
the worth of the U.S. Steel securities offered in the second-step
exchange.
The types of charges raised in the Marathon takeover-
manipulation, unfairness, coercion-recur frequently in securities liti-
gation and perhaps are even to be expected when a new technique is
introduced. However, where new techniques are involved, it is espe-
cially important to assess the validity of such charges in the context of
both law and policy, and if necessary, to formulate new regulatory
safeguards.
II. Do Two-TIERED OFFERS VIOLATE FEDERAL LAW?
A. Federal Regulation of Tender Offers
In the 1960's many corporations embarked on aggressive cam-
paigns to acquire controlling interests in other publicly held corpora-
tions. The offeror might acquire the stock of the target company in
private transactions, in the open market, or by making a public offer to
the shareholders of the target company to tender their shares, either for
cash, for securities of the offering corporation, or some combination of
the two. 8 These takeover bids were often bitterly contested by the
management of the target corporation, and there were claims that
shareholders were confused and charged of market manipulation and
coercion of shareholders.
When the acquiring corporation offered its own securities in ex-
change for shares of the target corporation, the securities had to be reg-
istered under the Securities Act of 19333" and the solicited shareholders
received a prospectus. In the case of cash tender offers, however, there
was no requirement for the filing of any solicitation material with the
SEC nor the dissemination of such material to target shareholders. 40
The Williams Act, passed by Congress in 1968, added several new
provisions to the 1934 Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to deal with
these problems.' 1 The Williams Act requires any person making a
3' In Ohio, appraisal is a judicial determination of the "fair cash value" of the dissenters'
shares one day prior to the merger. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.85(C) (Page 1978).
See Fleischer & Mundheim, Corporate Acquisition by Tender Offer, 115 U. PA. L. REV.
317, 317 (1967).
3' § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1976).
40 S. REP. NO. 550, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 2-4 (1967); H.R. Rep. No. 1711, 90TH CONG., 2D
SESS., 2-4 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2811. The proliferation of
cash tender offers as devices for securing corporate control is analyzed in detail in Hayes & Taus-
sig, Tactics of Cash Takeover Bids, 45 HARV. Bus. REV. 135 (1967).
41 Act of July 29, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 455. The Williams Act is codified as
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tender offer that would result in his owning more than five percent of a
class of registered securities to file with the SEC a statement setting
forth (a) the background of such person, (b) the source of the funds
used for the acquisition, (c) the purpose of the acquisition, (d) the num-
ber of shares owned, and (e) any relevant contracts, arrangements, or
understanding with any person with respect to any securities of the
target.42
The Williams Act and subsequent amendments also set forth a
timetable' regulating most tender offers:
1) Business Day Zero-the filing of the tender offer mater-
ials with the SEC by the bidder.
2) Business Day Three-dissemination of bidder's tender
offer to target shareholders.,"
3) Calendar Day Ten-date on which shareholders' rights
to have their tendered shares taken up on a pro rata
basis terminate (applies to tender offers for less than all
of the shares of the target company).45
4) Business Day Ten-date by which target management
must announce its position with respect to the tender of-
fer to target shareholders.46
5) Business Day Fifteen-date on which a shareholder's
right to withdraw tendered shares terminates.47
6) Business Day Twenty-minimum required period for
the tender offer to remain open.48
In addition, the Williams Act made it unlawful for any person to
omit or misstate a material fact, or to engage in any fraudulent, decep-
tive, or manipulative act, in connection with a tender offer.49 This
general antifraud provision, as with Rule 10b-550 before it, has been
embraced as a tool to attack the substance of tender offers.
an amendment to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §§ 13(d), 13(e), 14(d), 14(e), and 14(0, 15
U.S.C. §§ 78m(d), 78m(e), 78n(d), 78n(e), and 78n(f) (1976).
4, Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 14(d), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d) (1976).
4, The timetable format set forth herein is adapted from Pozen, Extended Proration Time
for Tender Offers Proposed, Legal Times of Wash., July 12, 1982, at 15, col. 1.
44 SEC Rule 14d-5(b)(3), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-5(b)(3) (1982).
4, Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 14(d)(6), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(6) (1976).
46 SEC Rule 14e-2, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-2 (1982).
47 SEC Rule 14d-7, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-7 (1982).
48 SEC Rule 14e-1, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-1 (1982).
4, Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 14(e), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1976).
" SEC Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1982).
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B. Two-Tiered Offers and Section 14(e)
1. Background
A tender offer remains open for a minimum of twenty business
days.5" Because tender offers are always made at prices above the pre-
vailing market price, there is a financial incentive for target sharehold-
ers to tender before this period elapses.
The degree of incentive to tender depends on the structure of the
offer. Thus, a shareholder's decision to tender may turn on whether the
offer is a partial tender offer for control (with no mention of a second-
step merger), a two-step, equal consideration offer in which the cash
offered in the first step is substantially equivalent to the value of the
securities exchanged in the second-step merger, or a two-step, two-
tiered offer in which the consideration paid in the first step is greater
than that paid in the second step. Further, each shareholder must de-
cide within a limited time whether to accept the offer or to decline and
face the attendant risks.
The shareholder who declines to tender in a partial offer for con-
trol (with no mention of a second-step merger)52 has decided to remain
a shareholder of the target corporation, whether because he believes
that the offer will trigger higher bids, that the value of the shares will
increase beyond the tender price because of the acquiror's reputation,
because of inability to understand or evaluate the offer, or for some
other reason.
A two-step offer to acquire 100% of the outstanding shares of a
target corporation presents much different problems. Confronted with
such an offer, the shareholder knows that he will not remain a share-
holder for long-he either tenders in the first step or he gets frozen out
in the second-step merger. Although equal consideration offers and
two-tiered offers are similar in that both look to 100% control of the
target, two-tiered offers are more likely to succeed and thus are consid-
ered "stronger."' s In an equal consideration two-step offer, the incen-
tives to tender are: (1) the prospect of earlier receipt of cash for those
who partake of the first-step offer; (2) the avoidance of some of the
brokerage commissions payable if the target shareholder sells the sec-
ond-step securities; and (3) fear that the offeror will not have sufficient
shares tendered to fulfill its condition for purchase of tendered shares,
61 See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
" An intention on the part of the tender offeror to transact a second-step merger must be
disclosed to the target shareholders. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 14(d)(1), 15 U.S.C.
§ 78n(d)(1) (1976); 17 C.F.R. sched. 13D, item 4 (1982).
'3 Fleischer, supra note 1, at 19, col. 4.
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resulting in a lost opportunity to realize a tender offer premium. These
incentives are also present in two-tiered offers, but, importantly, two-
tiered offers provide the additional strong incentive that tendering
shareholders will receive greater consideration than nontendering
shareholders. In the U.S. Steel offer, tendering Marathon shareholders
actually received blended benefits worth $105 per share;" nontendering
shareholders-those who also chose not to sell on the market-received
debt securities that have traded at near $78. 55 Thus, a target share-
holder confronted with an equal consideration two-step offer-for ex-
ample, $100 cash for 51% of the outstanding shares, followed by debt
securities valued at $100 for the remaining 49%-will have slightly less
incentive to tender than he would if confronted by a two-tiered of-
fer-for example, $115 in cash followed by debt securities valued at
$85.5" Nevertheless, both the equal consideration and two-tiered offers
have a blended cost of approximately $100 per share to the offeror.
2. Are Two-Tiered Offers Manipulative?
Section 14(e) of the Williams Act declares it unlawful "for any
person to make any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state
any material fact . . . or to engage in any fraudulent, deceptive, or
manipulative acts. . . in connection with any tender offer." Invoking
this section, Marathon shareholders have attacked the two-tiered tender
offer as a "manipulative act" in connection with a tender offer. They
have alleged that the two-tiered pricing structure creates "artificial
market influences" by coercing target shareholders to tender in order to
avoid being frozen out in the second-step, lower priced merger," and
argue that a shareholder's investment decision should be based on the
merits of the offer, not result from the coercive nature of the pricing
device.5 '
" Approximately 90% of the outstanding Marathon shares were tendered in the first step of
the offer. U.S. Steel purchased the number of these shares necessary to acquire a 51% controlling
interest in Marathon at the $125 per share first-step price. It then purchased the remainder of
these tendered shares in the second-step merger for the equivalent of $78 per share. Thus, the
blended price received by a Marathon shareholder who tendered his shares in the first step was
((.51/.90) x $125) + ((1 - .51/.90) x $78) = $105 per share.
" See supra note 32 and accompanying text. As interest rates have fallen since March 1982
the market value of the debt securities has substantially increased.
"4 In an equal consideration two-step offer, the offeror would pay (.51 x $100/share) + (.49
x $100/share), or an average price of $100/share. In a two-tiered offer, the offeror would pay (.51
x $115/share) + (.49 x $85/share), or an average price of $100.30/share.
, Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 14(e), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1976).
" Radol v. Thomas, 534 F. Supp. 1302, 1311 (S.D. Ohio 1982).
I d. The federal court that heard such allegations by dissident Marathon shareholders has
held, however, that those arguments are untenable as a matter of law. Radol v. Thomas, 556 F.
Supp. 586 (S.D. Ohio 1983) (order granting in part and denying in part defendants' motion for
19821
398 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 131:389
The Marathon shareholders' claim that a tender offer employing
two-tiered pricing is manipulative looks for support in the Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals' ruling in Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co.60 In that
action, Mobil challenged two "lock-up" options"' granted by Marathon
to U.S. Steel in their merger agreement. One option gave U.S. Steel
the right to purchase Marathon's crown jewel and biggest asset-its
interest in the Yates oil field-in the event that any other bidder was
successful in defeating U.S. Steel's bid. The second option granted U.S.
Steel the right to purchase up to ten million (17%) of Marathon's au-
thorized shares at an advantageous price of $90 per share.0 2
Taking a broad view of "manipulation" under section 14(e), the
court invalidated the two contractual options on the ground that they
greatly discouraged other bidders from making an offer for the Mara-
thon shares.6" The court noted that the interpretation of "manipula-
tion" must remain flexible in light of new techniques which artificially
affect securities markets: "The methods and techniques of manipulation
are limited only by the ingenuity of man. The aim must be therefore to
discover whether conduct has been intentionally engaged in which has
resulted in a price which does not reflect basic forces of supply and
demand."'"
Target shareholders facing a two-tiered offer thus will point to the
expansive interpretation given to "manipulation" in Mobil Corp. v.
Marathon Oil Co. when asking a court to invalidate such an offer. As
one commentator has stated:
[I]f Mobil v. Marathon is read not as a technical legal deci-
sion, but rather as a statement that the federal courts will
not tolerate unlimited gamesmanship and tactical maneuver-
ing at the expense of the investing public, one can easily see
a similar hostile judicial reaction against two-tiered pricing
utilizing the convenient rubric of manipulation for want of
something better." '
partial summary judgment).
6o 669 F.2d 366 (6th Cir. 1981).
61 A "lock-up" is an arrangement made in connection with a proposed acquisition of a pub-
licly held company which gives a potential acquiror an advantage in acquiring the target company
over other bidders or potential bidders. See Fraidin & Franco, Lock-Up Arrangements, 14 REV.
SEC. REG. 821 (1981). .
Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co., 669 F.2d 366, 367 (6th Cir. 1981).
Id. at 377. Due to the invalidation of the lock-up options, the original period for the U.S.
Steel tender offer was extended ten days to give other potential bidders time to make a competing
offer. For an analysis of the market impact and potential illegality of lock-ups in light of the
Marathon opinion, see Fraidin & Franco, supra note 61.
669 F.2d at 374 (quoting Cargill, Inc. v. Hardin, 452 F.2d 1154, 1163 (8th Cir. 1971),
cert. denied, 406 U.S. 932 (1972)).
*" Nathan, The Meaning of Marathon: Novel Legal Question Explored, Nat'l LJ., Mar.
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Despite the broad view of "manipulation" found in Marathon, the
claim that two-tiered tender offers are per se manipulative faces several
problems. First, most courts have interpreted "manipulation" narrowly.
Marathon's broad interpretation has not been followed in subsequent
cases, 66 primarily because of the Supreme Court's holding in Piper v.
Chris-Craft IndustriesS7 that section 14(e) is solely a disclosure provi-
sion and that Congress has not authorized the federal courts to scruti-
nize the substantive fairness of tender offers when adequate disclosure
was made.6" Further, due to a similarity in language, most courts have
interpreted section 14(e) as providing investors in the tender offer con-
text with virtually the same protection that section 10(b) and rule 10b-
5 provide in the ordinary purchase and sale of securities.69 In Santa Fe
Industries v. Green,7 0 the Supreme Court strictly construed the lan-
29, 1982, at 31, col. 3. Nathan adds, however, that the Marathon view of § 14(e) is likely to be
widely criticized as being erroneous. Id. at 31-32.
64 See, e.g., Whittaker Corp. v. Edgar, 535 F. Supp. 933 (N.D. Ill.), al'd sub noma. Bruns-
wick Corp. v. Whittaker Corp. (7th Cir. March 5, 1982) (no published opinion); Oklahoma Pub-
lishing Co. v. Standard Metals Corp., [1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
98,750, at 93,774-75 (W.D. Okla. May 25, 1982).
'7 430 U.S. 1, 24 (1977).
" Id. at 30-31.
" See, e.g., Golub v. PPD Corp., 576 F.2d 759, 764 (8th Cir. 1978); Gulf & Western Indus.
v. Great A & P Tea Co., 476 F.2d 687, 696 (2d Cir. 1973); Altman v. Knight, 431 F. Supp. 309
(S.D.N.Y. 1977).
Compare the language of § 14(e):
It shall be unlawful for any person to make any untrue statement of a material fact
or omit to state any material fact necessary in order to make the statements made,
in the light of the circumstances under which they are made, not misleading, or to
engage in any fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative acts or practices, in connection
with any tender offer or request or invitation for tenders, or any solicitation of
security holders in opposition to or in favor of any such offer, request, or invitation.
The Commission shall, for the purposes of this subsection, by rules and regulations
define, and prescribe means reasonably designed to prevent, such acts and practices
as are fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative.
with the language of § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976),
which makes it "unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly . . . (b) To use or employ, in
connection with the purchase or sale of any security. . . any manipulative or deceptive device or
contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe
.... " and the language of SEC Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1982), which makes it
unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly:
(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(2) to make any untrue statement of a material fact necessary in order to make the
statement made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were
made, not misleading, or
(3) to engage in any act, practice or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase
or sale of a security.
In Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 282 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092
(1981), the Seventh Circuit noted that the language of § 14(e) and § 10(b) are "coextensive in
their antifraud prohibitions, and differ only in their 'in connection with' language" and "are
therefore construed in pari materia by the courts."
70 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
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guage of section 10(b), stating that "non-disclosure is usually essential
to the success of a manipulative scheme" 1 and that manipulation "re-
fers generally to practices, such as wash sales, matched orders, or
rigged prices, that are intended to mislead investors by artificially af-
fecting market activity."
72
The common holding of Santa Fe and Chris-Craft thus appears to
be that there can be no manipulation when there is no deception in the
form of inadequate or misleading disclosure.73 It follows, then, that
there should be no per se finding of manipulation in two-tiered tender
offers so long as the offeror fully discloses his intention to acquire the
target in two steps and at two levels of consideration-that is, where
there is no misrepresentation. Indeed, the claim that a two-tiered offer
is coercive does not show that it is manipulative; rather, it amply dem-
onstrates that the offeror disclosed the two-tiered structure all too
well. 4
A second problem facing persons invoking Mobil v. Marathon is
that the manipulation claim that elicited the Sixth Circuit's broad read-
ing of section 14(e) implicated the two key lock-up options negotiated
by Marathon and U.S. Steel, not two-tiered pricing. The court noted
that it did "not purport to define a rule of decision for all claims of
manipulation under the Williams Act."'75 In fact, the Mobil court did
note that shareholders "not tendering their shares to [U.S. Steel would]
... risk being relegated to the 'back end' of [U.S. Steel's] takeover
proposal and [receive] only $90 per share," and nevertheless permitted
the offer to proceed.
7
1
The third, perhaps most significant, problem is a specific holding
that the alleged coercive effect of the two-tiered tender offer is not ma-
nipulative per se. In Radol v. Thomas,7 7 the case in which the Mara-
thon shareholders sought a preliminary injunction to block the second-
step merger between U.S. Steel and Marathon, the court held that
there was no showing of a substantial likelihood that the two-tiered,
two-step offer was coercive or manipulative in violation of section
14(e), noting that
71 Id. at 477 (citation omitted).
73 Id. at 476.
73 See, e.g., Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 283 (7th Cir. 1981) (misrepre-
sentation is a necessary element of any § 14(e) violation), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981).
7" See Martin Marietta Corp. v. Bendix Corp., Civ. No. Y-82-2560, slip op. at 15 (D. Md.
Sept. 22, 1982).
7'8 Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co., 669 F.2d 366, 377 (6th Cir. 1981).
78 Id.
" 534 F. Supp. 1302 (S.D. Ohio 1982). The court has since affirmed this decision by grant-
ing U.S. Steel's motion for summary judgment on the § 14(e) issue. Radol v. Thomas, 556 F.
Supp. 586 (S.D. Ohio 1983).
FRONT-END LOADED TENDER OFFERS
any tender offer is likely to be coercive to some degree. A
shareholder is faced with a limited time in which to decide
whether to accept the offered price for his shares, usually at
a premium over that at which the stock was previously trad-
ing, or decline the offer and face the attendant risk ...
Despite this inherent "coerciveness," Congress has not out-
lawed tender offers but only sought to regulate them, prima-
rily through mandatory disclosure provisions. 8
The Radol court also noted that the SEC's rules implicity permit
two-tiered tender offers. Rule 13e-3" prohibits fraudulent, deceptive,
or manipulative acts in connection with "going private" transactions
(those transactions which cause previously public companies to be held
by less than 300 persons or neither to be listed on any national securi-
ties exchange nor authorized to be quoted on an inter-dealer quotation
system of any registered national securities association) and prescribes
filing, disclosure, and dissemination requirements in connection with
such transactions. Rule 13e-3 creates an exemption from these filing
and disclosure requirements for second-step "clean-up" transactions,
such as mergers, that occur within one year of a tender offer, provided
that the consideration offered during the second-step merger is equal to
the highest consideration offered during the first-step tender offer."0
The court in Radol reasoned:
Where this "equal consideration" rule is not met, the "go-
ing private" transaction is subject to Rule 13e-3. Rule 13e-3
thus, by negative implication, acknowledges that [two-tiered
offers] occur and purports to regulate the second step of such
two-tiered transactions. While the Court finds neither the
decison in [Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co.] nor the im-
plicit recognition in Rule 13e-3 determinative of the validity
of such pricing arrangements under 14(e) or 10(b), they cau-
tion against any holding that such arrangements are per se
manipulative under § 14(e) or § 10(b)."1
The decision in Radol is not unique.8 2
78 534 F. Supp. at 1312. Although the SEC has never adopted a definition of the term
"tender offer," a number of courts have identified a "pressure to sell" as a principal characteristic.
E.g., Polinsky v. MCA, Inc., [1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 98,761, at
93,854 (9th Cir. July 8, 1982); Crane Co. v. Harsco Corp., 511 F. Supp. 294, 302-03 (D. Del.
1981); Wellman v. Dickinson, 475 F. Supp. 783, 823-25 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), afi'd, 682 F.2d 355 (2d
Cir. 1982).
' 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-3 (1982).
s0 SEC Rule 13e-3(g), 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-3(g) (1982).
st Radol v. Thomas, 534 F. Supp. at 1312 (footnote omitted).
'* Relying significantly on Radol, another court has rejected a similar argument that two-
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Further evidence that the SEC tacitly accepts two-tiered offers has
been its specific refusal to prohibit such transactions. The SEC has
considered and rejected a rule that would have given an opportunity to
receive equal consideration to shareholders still owning securities after
a "going private" transaction.8" Although this differs from the context
of outside tender offers, it does indicate an unwillingness to require
equal consideration generally. The SEC has also issued a series of No-
Action Letters in response to proposed acquisitions involving two-tiered
pricing.
8 4
Mobil v. Marathon notwithstanding, it seems clear that two-tiered
tender offers should not be found manipulative per se. This is not to
suggest, however, that all two-tiered offers will avoid a finding of ma-
nipulation. A hostile judicial reaction could conceivably result from a
fact situation in which (1) a surprise partial tender offer was structured
in two widely disparate pricing tiers with a first-step cash offer at a
substantial premium over the pre-offer market value and second-step
consideration below the pre-offer market value, (2) the low second-step
consideration effectively acted .as a ceiling or cap on the market price 5
of the target stock during the interim between the first and second steps
so as to prevent holders of unpurchased shares from realizing the post-
offer market price that otherwise would have prevailed, and (3) the
applicable state appraisal statute" defines the pre-merger market
price-the price that is artificially prevented from rising by the an-
nouncement of the inordinately low second-step merger considera-
tionS-as a fair price for dissenting shareholders.
tiered offers are per se manipulative. Martin Marietta Corp. v. Bendix Corp., Civ. No. Y-82-
2560, slip op. at 15-17 (D. Md. Sept. 22, 198-2).
" Proposed Rule 13e-3A(c)(3)(vii), SEC Securities Act Release No. 5567, 40 Fed. Reg.
7947, 7952 (1975) (intended to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-3A(c)(3)(vii) (proposed Feb. 6,
1975).
" No-Action Letters (E.I. duPont de Nemours and Co., available July 27, 1981) (acquisi-
tion proposal for Conoco, Inc., including option); No-Action Letters (Allied Corp., available June
13, 1981) (three-step acquisition proposal for Bunker-Ramo Corp.); No-Action Letters (Whee-
labrator-Frye, Inc., available Septemer 22, 1980) (acquisition proposal for Pullman, Inc., includ-
ing option).
" For a discussion of the market reaction to tender offers, see infra notes 102-14 and accom-
panying text.
" For a discussion of existing appraisal statutes and proposed reforms, see infra notes 156-78
and accompanying text.
s' For example, assume XYZ stock is selling for $75 per share when a two-tiered bid is
announced offering $100 per share for 51% of the shares in the first step and $50 per share for the
remainder in the second-step merger. The harshest result would occur if exactly 51% of the shares
were tendered during the first step. All of these shares would be taken up at $100 per share.
Assuming 51% control would give the offeror sufficient voting power to push through the second-
step merger (if, for example, the target were a Delaware corporation, see supra note 25), the
remaining 49% of the shares would be taken up at $50 per share, far below the pre-offer market
value. The effect on those shares not tendered in the first step is even more striking because the
announced $50 second-step consideration will act as a ceiling should any such shares be sold in the
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Such a scenario could validate the concern expressed in Mobil v.
Marathon regarding practices that impose "an artificial ceiling on the
price of [target] shares" and that effectively deter other, potentially
more lucrative, bids."8 In fact, in upholding U.S. Steel's two-tiered of-
fer, the court in Radol v. Thomas 9 noted that U.S. Steel's second-step
consideration "offered Marathon shareholders a substantial premium
over the prices [at] which Marathon shares had been trading,"90 im-
plying that the court may have been less willing to approve the two-
tiered offer had the second-step consideration been significantly lower
than the market price for Marathon shares prevailing before the two-
tiered offer was announced.
f Although situations may exist in which "manipulation" does in
fact occur, that possibility hardly justifies the imposition of a per se
prohibition against two-tiered offers. Given the Supreme Court's nar-
row view of "manipulation" and the SEC's hands-off attitude, courts
need to proceed carefully to avoid tipping the scales in favor of the
target while ostensibly protecting unsophisticated investors. As the
Radol v. Thomas court indicated, shareholders may actually benefit
from the two-tiered structure: instead of capping market prices, U.S.
Steel's two-tiered offer caused Mobil to raise its overall price per share
offer.91 Such manipulation is not the type contemplated in section
14(e).
C. The Coercive Effect of Two-Tiered Offers
Closely related to claims of manipulation are those assailing the
inherently coercive nature of the two-tier structure. In essence, these
claims force courts to consider the validity of the two-tiered offer within
the general federal regulatory framework.
1. The Equal Consideration Argument
Two noted commentators, Victor Brudney- and Marvin Chirel-
stein, concluding that two-tiered tender offers are coercive and unfairly
penalize those shareholders who would prefer to hold their shares,92
market. Further, even if holders of shares not taken in the first step dissent, state appraisal statutes
may value their rights on the basis of the pre-merger market price-i.e., $50.
U 669 F.2d at 377.
8 See supra notes 77-81 and accompanying text.
90 534 F. Supp. 1302, 1313 (S.D. Ohio 1982).
91 Id. at 1313.
92 Given the inability of [a target's] dispersed stockholders to communicate with one
another during the tender, the act of offering a higher price on tender than would
be paid on merger would have a "whipsaw" effect on [the target's] stockholders.
Individual stockholders would find it difficult or impossible to refuse a tender price
1982]
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advocate a rule requiring that the same price per share be paid in both
steps of the two-tiered offer.9"
It is not simply "coercion" that Brudney and Chirelstein perceive
as the vice of two-tiered pricing. To the contrary, they admit that
freezeouts, "by definition, are coercive: minority stockholders are bound
by majority rule. . . . But this alone does not render freezeouts objec-
tionable. Majority rule always entails coercion."'" The authors adopt
the view, however, that majority rule is an "acceptable rule of govern-
ance [only] if all members of the voting constituency-. . . will be identi-
cally affected by the outcome of the vote."95 The authors point out that
two-tiered pricing denies the nontendering minority any pro rata share
of the acquisition premium that is an implicit part of the first-step cash
offer. This unequal treatment of the minority is, in their view, unfair. 98
The fallacy in the authors' reasoning is their implicit assumption that
there is a reasonable expectation that would support a legal require-
ment that equal treatment be accorded to all shares, as distinct from
equal opportunity for all shareholders.
Equal treatment of shares is a policy restricted in application to
the tendering portion of a two-step acquisition. Section 14(d)(7) of the
Williams Act "was intended to ensure the equal treatment of all share-
holders who tender to a bidder and has been administered by the Com-
mission in a manner intended to achieve that purpose."9" The section
requires that "when a bidder increases the amount of consideration of-
fered [in the tender offer], the higher consideration [must] be paid to all
shareholders, including those who- tendered prior to the increase."98 On
of $40 when they are also made aware that if the tender succeeds, the remaining
shares will be merged out at $30. In effect, an announced disparity between the
tender and the merger figure would deprive [the target's] stockholders of their abil-
ity to make an unforced, independent judgment on whether an average of $35 per
share is an acceptable overall price for the assets of the firm.
Brudney & Chirelstein, Fair Shares in Corporate Mergers and Takeovers, 88 HARV. L. REV. 297,
336-37 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Fair Shares].
" Id. Brudney and Chirelstein argue that a two-tiered offer is indistinguishable from a uni-
tary purchase of assets because both transactions result in a complete transfer of the targets assets
and in both dissenting shareholders are forced out. They argue that the equal treatment afforded
shareholders in the sale of assets situation (each shareholder shares pro rata when the proceeds
from the sale are distributed in liquidation) should not be circumvented when a first-step tender
offer is followed by a second-step merger. Id. at 334-36. For a strong argument that the Brudney
and Chirelstein analysis overlooks the important distinctions between these two types of transac-
tions, see Toms, Compensating Shareholders Frozen Out in Two-Step Mergers, 78 COLUM. L.
REV. 548, 554-64 (1978).
" Restatement, supra note 28, at 1357.
'7Id.
Fair Shares, supra note 92, at 336-37.
*7 Letter from SEC Chairman Harold Williams to Sen. William Proxmire (Feb. 15, 1980),
reprinted in [1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 82,453, at 82,911 (accompany-
ing SEC-proposed Senate Bill 3188) (emphasis added).
93 Id.
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its face, that requirement applies only to shares tendered and does not
affect the value exchanged in the second-step merger. Further, as dis-
cussed earlier, the federal tender offer rules implicitly permit two-tiered
tender offers.99
Because there can be no examination of the substantive fairness of
tender offers under federal law,100 the equal treatment argument's only
chance of success rests on whether adverse market behavior is
proven.101 An examination of market reaction to analogous partial
tender offers for contro °1 02 may be helpful in determining whether an
equal consideration rule should be adopted for two-step offers for 100%
control.103 A detailed empirical study of 258 partial tender offers for
control made between 1962 and 1977, performed by Michael Bradley,
provides a good basis for this examination.'
Bradley's statistical composite of 161 successful single-step offers
reveals the following composite picture. Target stock that traded at an
index price of 100, two months prior to a tender offer, gradually in-
creased in value to 119 as rumors or inside transactions influenced the
market. The statistically typical target then elicited a tender offer of
149. Thus, Bradley found that the average control premium was 49%
over the market price of 100 that had prevailed prior to the price rise to
119 in anticipation of the offer.1 05 The average tender offer premium
was 25% over the market price (i.e., 119) that prevailed on the day
prior to the offer.10 6 The important conclusion for the purpose of this
Comment, however, is that some time after the purchase of tendered
shares, the minority noncontrol shares traded for 136, 13 index points
" See supra text accompanying notes 76-81. Even the proposed but unimplemented "best
price rule," proposed rule 14e-4, SEC Exchange Act Release No. 16385, 44 Fed. Reg. 70,349,
70,355-56 (1979), requiring offerors to pay all tendering shareholders the highest amount of con-
sideration offered to any of them, again is only applicable to the first-step tender offer and not to
the consideration of the second-step merger. For a thorough analysis of pre- and post-1980 pro-
posed and final tender offer rules, see Nathan & Volk, Developments in Acquisitions and Acquisi-
tion Techniques Under the Williams Act, in PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE, TWELFH ANNUAL
INSTITUTE ON SECURMES REGULATION 159 (1981).
00 See Martin Marietta Corp. v. Bendix Corp., Civ. No. Y-82-2560, slip op. at 9 (D. Md.
Sept. 22, 1982).
"0I See supra text accompanying notes 88-90.
'0 A partial tender offer for control is a single-step tender offer for less than 100% of the
target company's shares which, if successful, will give the offeror effective control of the corpora-
tion. For purposes of this discussion, it is assumed that the offeror in such a partial tender offer
makes no mention of a second-step merger.
I" Partial tender offers for control have, on occasion, directly competed with two-step offers
for 100% control. An example is the Seagram offer for as much as 51% of Conoco shares in which
the Du Pont two-tiered, two-step offer for 100% of the common stock finally prevailed. See E.I.
Du Pont de Nemours and Company, Proxy Statement 12-14 (July 20, 1981).
'" Bradley, Interfirm Tender Offers and the Market for Corporate Control, 53 J. Bus. 345
(1980).
105 Id. at 345-46, 362 (fig. #2).
10 See id. at 362-63 (figs. #1 & #2).
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less than the price paid in the tender offer.10 7 Thus, target shareholders
who fail to tender to a partial (one-step) tender offer should expect to
receive less than the tender offer price if they later decide to sell their
shares in the market. This finding supports the conclusion that two-
step tender offers for 100% control should not need to provide equal
consideration in both steps-indeed, that the offer should be permitted
to be structured in two tiers so as to follow the natural market reaction.
Bradley's findings support his conclusion that "stockholders re-
spond rationally" to tender offers.'08 According to Bradley's analysis,
the target shareholder rationally considers a blended average of the
tender offer price and the expected subsequent post-offer market
value.' 0 9 Even though Bradley considers only single-step offers, his cal-
culations are comparable to the calculation that a rational shareholder
confronted with an integrated two-step offer might carry out. Such a
shareholder rationally would consider the blended average of the first-
step and second-step consideration.
A shareholder, according to this analysis, would have tendered all
of his shares to the previously described statistically typical offer priced
at 149, precisely because the shareholder would have anticipated that
he would have no better market opportunity after the expiration of the
tender offer. All other shareholders would, in this theoretical model,
have also acted on the same expectation of a greater premium for
shares in the tender offer than in the post-tender-offer trading mar-
ket."10 If the typical partial offer was structured to purchase, say, 51%
of outstanding shares, and all shareholders tendered, 49% of each
shareholder's tendered block would be returned. Each shareholder
would then have the opportunity to sell his remaining shares in the
market for cash. The combined average amount realized from both
steps would be $143/share."' That financial outcome, therefore, is
comparable to a two-step, two-tiered takeover with a first-step cash of-
fer for 51% of shares at 149, and securities in the second-step merger
with a market value of 136. The financial result for the shareholder
would also be comparable to an equal consideration two-step acquisi-
tion with a partial cash offer of 143 and with securities in the second-
step merger that also command a market value of 143. As discussed
107 Id. at 346-47, 362-65.
108 Id. at 365.
10 Id. at 352-53.
110 Id. at 353-55.
""' Id. at 353 (applying equation (1)). The average price of $143/share is arrived at as
follows: 51% of all shares are purchased in the tender at $149/share and the remaining 49% of the
shares are sold in the market at the post-tender market price of $136/share. Thus, (.51 x 149) +
(.49 x 136)= $143.
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earlier," 2 however, the practical weakness of the equal consideration
two-step offer is that it gives many shareholders too little incentive to
tender.
It is clear that the acquisition premium inherent either in a partial
offer or in the first step of a two-tiered offer creates an incentive or
pressure to tender. The courts take the position, however, that "pres-
sure on stockholders to decide whether to sell is the primary character-
istic of a tender offer." ' Thus, it should make no difference whether
that pressure derives from the price spread between a partial (one-step)
offer and the expected post-offer market, or from the spread between
the first- and second-step consideration in a two-tiered offer; it would
not be sound policy to attempt to eliminate the source of the pressure in
either case.
One could argue that there is potential for much greater pressure
to tender in a two-tiered offer as opposed to a partial tender offer-if,
for example, the second-step consideration were structured at a value
much lower than the post-offer market would value target shares after
a partial tender offer. The appropriate legal response, however, is not
to require equal consideration in both steps, but rather to focus on the
fairness of the second-step consideration and determine what reforms in
the appraisal remedy are needed in the context of two-tiered offers.
The potential for an unfair second-step price present in two-tiered of-
fers but not present in the partial tender offers studied by Bradley does
not invalidate the analytic comparison of partial and two-tiered offers
provided there is an acceptable appraisal remedy for unfair second-step
consideration. Proposals for reform of present appraisal remedies to ad-
dress this problem are discussed later in this Comment. 4
2. The Stampeding Effect of Section 14(d)(6)
As noted above,115 the incentive to tender in a two-tiered offer is
more compelling than it is in a two-step, equal consideration offer be-
cause only in the former will tendering shareholders receive greater
consideration than nontendering shareholders. Prior to the recent adop-
tion of SEC Rule 14d-8,"' shareholders subject to a two-tiered offer
were pressured to tender quickly because only those shareholders who
.. See supra text accompanying notes 53-56.
"" Crane Co. v. Harsco Corp., 511 F. Supp. 294, 302 (D. Del. 1981). See also Radol v.
Thomas, 534 F. Supp. 1302, 1312 (S.D. Ohio 1982); Wellman v. Dickinson, 475 F. Supp. 783,
823-24 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), aff'd, 682 F.2d 355 (2d Cir. 1982).
.1. See infra notes 165-78 and accompanying text.
1 See supra text accompanying notes 53-55.
SEC Rule 14d-8, 47 Fed. Reg. 57,679 (1982) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-8).
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tendered within the first ten days of the offer were assured that some or
all of their shares would be purchased at the higher first-step price.
Section 14(d)(6) of the Securities Exchange Act provides that when an
offer is made for less than all of the outstanding shares of the target
corporation,' 17 the offeror must purchase the shares tendered within the
first ten calendar days on a pro rata basis.118 Thus, if a bidder offered
to buy 51% of the target company's shares, and 100% of such shares
were tendered within ten days of the offer, the bidder must purchase
51% of each shareholder's shares. If only 51% of the shares were ten-
dered within the first ten days, the offeror could purchase all of these
shares at the higher first-step price and then reject any shares tendered
thereafter, thus relegating such shares to the lower second-step merger
price.
119
Bidders recently have taken advantage of the acute pressure to
tender caused by the combination of the two-tiered offer and the ten-
day proration period.120 As stated by one commentator,
a two-tiered pricing structure has the advantage of ensuring
a high percentage of tenders during the proration period,
since the target shareholders know (or should know) that if
they do not tender within the proration period they will al-
most inevitably be relegated to the "low back end" of the
second step merger. Coupled with a 10-calendar-day prora-
tion period (the shortest possible under [section] 14(d)(6) of
the exchange act), the two-tiered pricing structure can, and
is intended to, create an atmosphere of stampede among the
target company's shareholders.
1 2 1
21 By definition, the first step in a two-step acquisition is always an offer for less than all of
the outstanding shares of the target.
n1 Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 14(d)(6), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(6) (1976).
1 Assume, for example, that XYZ stock is trading for $75 per share. If a two-tiered offer
were made, offering $115 in the first step for 51% control and $85 in the second step for the
remainder, target shareholders would seek to maximize the number of their shares taken in the
first step. They would thus tender within the ten-day proration deadline. Since it is highly un-
likely that 100% of the outstanding shares would be tendered, see Radol v. Thomas, 534 F. Supp.
1302, 1305 (S.D. Ohio 1982) (even though U.S. Steel was certain to succeed, only about 90% of
the shares were tendered during the time the proration pool remained open), each shareholder
who does tender will have more than 51% of his shares purchased at the higher first-step price. If,
however, an equal consideration offer were made, offering $100 in the first step for 51% control
and $100 in the second step for the remainder, "small" shareholders may decide not to tender.
Although they may believe that $100 is a fair price, such shareholders may reason that their
tender would have virtually no effect on the success of the offer and that they will receive $100
whether they tender in the first step or wait to get frozen out in the second step. Such shareholders
lose nothing by holding their shares, but gain a possible opportunity to sell if the market trading
price, by happenstance, jumps above $100.
"1o See supra note 1.
" Nathan, supra note 65, at 31, col. 1. See also Fleischer, supra note 1, at 19, col. 3, who
states:
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Although the stampeding effect was a welcome phenomenon from
the bidder's point of view, it pressured target shareholders into tender-
ing their shares without sufficient information to make a sophisticated
investment decision. First, target management is not required to an-
nounce its position with respect to the tender offer until the tenth busi-
ness day following the commencement of the offer,1" which is several
days after the tenth-calendar-day proration deadline. Second, many tar-
get shareholders do not receive the bidder's tender offer materials until
several days into the ten-calendar-day proration period or later,' giv-
ing such shareholders little or no time to digest the information and
tender within the proration deadline. Third, while arbitrageurs and in-
stitutional investors have the resources and sophistication to obtain the
tender offer materials on the first day of the offer and to arrange for
prompt delivery of tendered shares to the bidder's depository, more un-
sophisticated shareholders, whose shares are often held in street name
or by nominees, will find it difficult to deliver their shares within the
ten-calendar-day deadline. 2 "
3. The New Proration Rule and a Suggested Alternative
The stampeding effect caused by the combination of the two-tiered
tender offer and the ten-calendar-day proration period received much
criticism and prompted the SEC to solicit proposals for reform."2
It became clear that the most effective way to eliminate the stam-
peding effect was to extend the proration period beyond ten calendar
days. On December 28, 1982, the Securities and Exchange Commission
put into effect a rule adopting just such a solution. Amended rule 14d-
8126 now requires a bidder in an offer for less than all of the target's
shares to purchase on a pro rata basis all shares tendered during the
entire period the offer remains open: a minimum of twenty business
days. The rule is aimed at eliminating both the coercive atmosphere
resulting from and the advantages given to sophisticated investors by
the ten-day proration period, a situation notably exacerbated by the
[A] partial bid creates a drive for stock to be tendered within 10 calendar days
because tenders within that period are in a preferred pool for acceptance by the
bidder. The pressure is more acute in a front-end loaded deal, because, if a share-
holder misses the proration pool, his shares will be purchased at the lower second-
step price.
,1 SEC Rule 14e-2(a), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-2(a) (1982). Of course, there is nothing to
prevent target management from announcing its position at an earlier date.
it SEC Exchange Act Release No. 18761, 47 Fed. Reg. 24,338, 24,340 (1982).
14 See Pozen, Extended Proration Time for Tender Offers Proposed, Legal Times of Wash.,
July 12, 1982, at 15, col. 3.
" SEC Exchange Act Release No. 19336, 47 Fed. Reg. 57,679, 57,679-80 (1982).
,52 SEC Rule 14d-8, 47 Fed. Reg. 57,679 (1982) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-8).
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advent of the two-tiered tender offer.
Although rule 14d-8 eliminates much of the confusion experienced
by less informed investors and goes a long way toward curing the stam-
peding effect of two-tiered offers, there is a serious question as to
whether the SEC exceeded its authority in adopting it. First, it is not
clear that the SEC had the power to adopt rule 14d-8. In enacting the
Williams Act in 1968, Congress, despite the SEC's request, refused to
grant the SEC rulemaking power under section 14(d)(6) to alter the
ten-day proration period.127 Eager to have the Williams Act passed, the
SEC was willing to accept a denial of rulemaking power with respect
to section 14(d)(6), asserting that it would go back to Congress should
serious problems later arise.1 28 Rather than go back to Congress, how-
ever, the SEC sidestepped the limit on its authority under section
14(d)(6), and adopted rule 14d-8 under the rulemaking authority
granted under section 14(e).129
Section 14(e), which makes it unlawful for any person to engage
in fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative acts in connection with a
tender offer,130 was amended in 1970 to give the SEC rulemaking
power to prescribe means reasonably designed to prevent such acts." 1
The amendment was deemed necessary to allow the SEC to "deal more
adequately with the sophisticated devices sometimes employed by both
'" Full Disclosure of Corporate Equity Ownership and in Corporate Takeover Bids: Hear-
ings on S. 510 Before the Subcomm. on Securities of the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency,
90th Cong., 1st Sess. 39, 191 (1967) (statements of Manuel F. Cohen, Chairman, SEC) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Senate Hearings].
Compare, for example, Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 14(d)(5), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(1)
(1976), which permits tendered shares to be withdrawn within the first seven calendar days after
the offer was made. The SEC, in rule 14d-7, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-7, extended the withdrawal
period to fifteen business days. Unlike the case of § 14(d)(6), Congress granted the SEC rulemak-
ing authority in § 14(d)(5) to amend the law to protect investors.
1.. The House bill extended proration for the duration of the tender offer and conferred
rulemaking power in the Commission to change the proration period if it believed a shorter period
to be in he public interest. The Senate bill required proration only during the first ten days of the
offer and conferred no rulemaking power on the Commission to change it. Commenting on these
two bills, the Commission stated:
while . . .we prefer the provisions of the House bill to those of the Senate bill,
insofar as the two differ, we regard these points as of lesser significance compared
with the importance of enacting this needed legislation at this session of Congress.
If this committee accepts the Senate version, we believe we could live with it. If
experience demonstrated that there were serious problems, we could and would
come back to you.
Takeover Bids: Hearings on H.R. 14475 and S. 510 Before the Subcomm. on Commerce and
Finance of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 19
(1968) (statement of Manuel F. Cohen, Chairman, SEC).
rn SEC Exchange Act Release No. 19336, supra note 125.
See supra notes 57-90 and accompanying text.
1' Act of Dec. 22, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-567, § 5, 84 Stat. 1497, 1497-98 (codified at 15
U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1976)).
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sides in contested tender offers." ' 2 There is, however, nothing in the
legislative history of section 14(e) to indicate that Congress intended to
permit the SEC to alter the force or effect of section 14(d)(6) or any
other unambiguous language found in the securities laws. Thus, there
is doubt as to whether the SEC's rulemaking authority under section
14(e) is broad enough to extend the ten-day proration period of section
14(d)(6).
Second, even assuming the SEC has the authority under section
14(e) to adopt rules which affect other sections of the Exchange Act, it
is not clear that it can adopt a rule such as 14d-8, which directly con-
travenes the statutory language of section 14(d)(6). As SEC Commis-
sioner Shad noted in his dissent from the adoption of rule 14d-8,"' the
Supreme Court has held that where congressional language is unam-
biguous, there is no power to amend it by regulation.'" It is difficult to
find language more clear on its face than that of section 14(d)(6), which
provides that where more shares are tendered "within ten days after
.. .the offer [is made] than [the offeror] is. . .willing to take up and
pay for, the securities taken up shall be taken up as nearly as may be
pro rata .... ,,1 5
Third, the legislative history of section 14(d)(6) shows that Con-
gress considered and rejected a rule requiring proration for the entire
period of the tender offer. As originally proposed in 1967, the bill that
ultimately became the Williams Act required proration for the entire
period a tender offer was to remain open."3 6 Congress, however, per-
suaded by several commentators, determined that such a proposal could
unduly favor target management in its effort to frustrate a takeover
attempt. As stated by one Senate witness:
[I]f pro rata acceptance is made mandatory for the entire pe-
riod of the tender offer it will cause most investors to delay
their decisions for an unnecessarily long period and thus give
the incumbent management an unfair time advantage for
launching the powerful counteroffensive moves which are
available to it.
The point here is that there are a number of moves
132 H.R. REP. NO.1663, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 6, reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 5025, 5031.
133 SEC Exchange Act Release No. 19336, supra note 125, 47 Fed. Reg. at 57,680-81.
IU See, e.g., Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6, 24 (1969); Comm v. Acker, 361 U.S. 87, 92
(1959); Koshland v. Helvering, 298 U.S. 441, 447 (1936); Mourning v. Family Publications Serv.,
Inc., 449 F.2d 235, 241-42 (5th Cir. 1971).
1" Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 14(d)(6), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(6) (1976).
I" S. 510, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 113 CONG. REC. 856-57 (1967).
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which management can take, once it is aware of the bid.
These moves take time to launch, to get set. And the longer a
period of time they have to do this before investors have to
irrevocably commit their shares, the more chance they have
of defeating the bid."3 '
Relying on testimony such as the above,138 Congress in 1968 ex-
pressly rejected a rule essentially identical to rule 14d-8-a rule requir-
ing proration for the entire period of the tender offer."3 9 By ignoring
this rather clear legislative history, the SEC may have undercut fatally
the validity of its new rule.
Although any variation of the statutory ten-day-proration period
might fall if challenged, an alternative rule that increases the proration
period from the present ten calendar days to fifteen business days could
better face the legal barrier posed by the legislative history of section
14(d)(6)."40 First, this proposal provides target shareholders with suffi-
cient time to make informed investment decisions without giving target
management an undue amount of time to mount a counteroffensive .
41
The proposal thus better achieves the delicate balance Congress in-
tended by enacting the Williams Act: namely, that any rule changes
'37 Senate Hearings, supra note 127, at 59 (statement of Professor Samuel L. Hayes).
2" See also id. at 77 ("The difficulty with the pro rata method when employed for a longer
period results in part from the fact that the offeror cannot determine the percentage of shares
which it will purchase until the total number of shares tendered has been ascertained at the expi-
ration of the offer.") (statement of Donald L. Calvin); id. at 108 ("[Wle believe it advisable to
limit the period in which the takeup is pro rata in order to conform to existing [New York Stock
Exchange] practices providing for an initial pro rata period followed by a first-come, first-serve
period of takeups so that depositors will more quickly know their position in respect to the tender
offer and so as to prevent volume tenders at the close of the offering.") (statement of Robert W.
Haack).
"' S. REP. No. 550, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 4-5 (1967).
140 Such a rule was suggested by Pozen, supra note 124, at 15, col. 2.
... Given a great deal of time, target management can often use its great resources and influ-
ential position with target shareholders to defeat a tender offer.
Management's record [of defeating cash tender offers] can probably be attributed to
the numerous advantages it has in combatting a tender offer. Management has the
resources of the corporation at its disposal to defend against what it will character-
ize as a dangerous threat to existing corporate policy. It can communicate its oppo-
sition to the shareholders by letter or advertisement. Since it possesses the share-
holder list, it knows which shareholders hold large blocks of stock and should be
wooed individually. It may have strong allies-banks with which the corporation
keeps deposits, insurance companies with which it places business, suppliers, and
customers. The banks might withhold financing needed by the offeror. The other
allies might buy stock in the market and thus push up the price. Any of them might
be helpful in keeping stock from being tendered. The corporation itself might buy
some stock or raise its dividend-both of which may have the effect of increasing
the price of the stock. Other techniques used to defend against tender offers includes
[sic] attempts to arrange mergers with other companies, or attempts to block the
acquisition on the ground that it would violate the antitrust laws or some other
regulatory statute.
Senate Hearings, supra note 127, at 137 (statement of Robert H. Mundheim).
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favor neither the bidder nor the target.141
Second, this alternative proposal has the withdrawal period and
the proration period end at the same time-at the end of the fifteenth
business day following the commencement of a tender offer. The SEC
has determined that a fifteen-day withdrawal period1 43 enables a share-
holder to make and effect an informed investment decision. If fifteen
business days is deemed sufficient time to exercise withdrawal rights,
there is no apparent reason why shareholders need proration rights af-
ter that time. Moreover, a rule which pegs the termination of proration
rights on the same day as the termination of withdrawal rights would
alleviate some of the shareholder confusion surrounding the various
dates affecting tender offers.
A final advantage enjoyed by the fifteen-day proration period is
that, unlike rule 14d-8, it has not been rejected by Congress.'" That
fact, in conjunction with the alternative proposal's substantive benefits,
would enable it to better withstand judicial scrutiny.
In view of the potentially destructive stampede effect brought on
by two-tiered tender offers, something like rule 14d-8 is necessary. Giv-
ing shareholders sufficient time to make informed investment decisions
will alleviate problems of the sort contemplated by Congress when it
passed the Williams Act. Because the current regulatory framework
can resolve satisfactorily the major investor concern with two-tiered
tender offers-lack of time-there is hardly a need to forbid such offers
out of hand. To do so would be to subvert the essentially neutral stance
of the Williams Act with regard to corporate takeovers.
III. RELIEF UNDER STATE LAw
A. Fiduciary Duty and the Entire Fairness Argument
Persons challenging two-tiered offers are not limited to claims
under federal law; they may also look to state law for redress. Although
143 It is clear that the Williams Act was intended to favor neither side in control contests.
Senator Williams stated that the purpose of the bill was to protect investors without encouraging
or discouraging tender offers: "We have taken extreme care to avoid tipping the scales either in
favor of management or in favor of the person making the takeover bids. S. 510 is designed solely
to require full and fair disclosure for the benefit of investors." 113 CONG. REC. 24,664 (1967). See
also Edgar v. MITE Corp., 102 S. Ct. 2629, 2636 (1982); Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., 430 U.S.
1, 31 (1977); Senate Hearings, supra note 127, at 3.
143 SEC Rule 14d-7, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-7(a) (1982). The bidder's tender offer materials
must be disseminated to target shareholders by business day three, SEC Rule 14d-5(b)(3), 17
C.F.R. § 240.14d-5(b)(3) (1982), and target management must disseminate its reply by business
day ten. SEC Rule 14e-2, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-2 (1982). See supra notes 44-48 and accompany-
ing text. Thus, by business day fifteen, the target shareholders have had adequate time to review
and digest the offer and to make an informed investment decision.
144 See supra notes 136-38 and accompanying text.
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outright state regulation of tender offers has been restricted sharply by
the Supreme Court's decision in Edgar v. MITE Corp.,145 the common
law of fiduciary duty remains useful in channeling corporate behavior.
Shareholders owning enough stock to control a corporation, or
those who actually control a corporation, owe a fiduciary duty to the
remaining shareholders to safeguard their interests and treat them
fairly.14 6 Where controlling shareholders are corporations that acquired
control through tender offers, the fiduciary duty owed nontendering
shareholders presents analytical difficulties when that duty is invoked to
block second-step mergers.
In Singer v. Magnavox Co.,14 North American Phillips Corpora-
tion sought to acquire all the shares of Magnavox in a two-step offer.
North American announced its intention to acquire the entire equity
interest in Magnavox, and, contingent on the number of shares ac-
quired through the first-step tender, noted that it would resort to a
second-step merger or similar transaction to acquire the remaining
shares. North American acquired roughly eighty-four percent of
Magnavox in the first step and the remaining sixteen percent was ab-
sorbed eight months later in a second-step merger. Although the consid-
eration paid was the same in both steps, dissenting shareholders sought
to enjoin the merger. Finding for the shareholders, the Supreme Court
of Delaware rejected the argument that appraisal was the sole remedy
for dissenting stockholders and declared that a merger effected "for the
sole purpose of freezing out minority stockholders . . . [is a] violation
of a fiduciary duty for which the Court may grant. . . relief.""" This
fiduciary duty, owed by North American as majority stockholder to the
minority, could be discharged only if there was a "business purpose"149
for the merger independent of the freezeout, and, even if such a "busi-
ness purpose" were demonstrated, the merger had to be "entirely fair"
145 102 S. Ct. 2629, 2636 (1982).
148 See generally W. CARY & M. EISENBERG, CORPORATIONS 613-37 (5th ed. 1980) (leading
cases).
14? 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977).
548 Id. at 980.
14' [After this Comment went to press, the Supreme Court of Delaware eliminated the busi-
ness-purpose test. In Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983), the court held that
other safeguards have made the test unnecessary in the parent-subsidiary context, and that the
requirement "shall no longer be of any force or effect." Id. at 715.]
In Tanzer v. International Gen. Indus., 379 A.2d 1121, 1123 (Del. 1977), the Delaware
Supreme Court decided that it is the business purpose of the parent, not the subsidiary, that is
relevant for purposes of this test. That is, a merger that bestows an economic benefit upon the
parent corporation satisfies the standard of fiduciary conduct required by Singer, provided the
transaction was otherwise "entirely fair" to the minority stockholders of the subsidiary. By giving
a parent wide latitude to point to some benefit or increased efficiency to justify the merger and
thus satisfy the business purpose test, Tanzer greatly reduces the impact of Singer. See Easter-
brook & Fischel, Corporate Control Transactions, 91 YALE L.J. 698, 725 (1982).
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to the minority shareholders."'
For purposes of recognizing a fiduciary duty, a merger that repre-
sents the second step of a single plan to gain complete control of a
target should be distinguished from mergers of long-held affiliates. In
the latter case there has been a long-term relationship between the
two firms, with one managing or controlling the other, and the fiduci-
ary relationship is especially important because it has developed over
time: the minority has in fact relied on the majority and maintains an
expectation of fairness. Contrarily, the second step of a unitary plan to
acquire a target cannot be viewed as a transaction between related par-
ties, and thus no fiduciary duty should be recognized. 51 At the an-
nouncement of a two-step tender offer, the bidding corporation is an
unrelated outsider-it is in an adversarial relationship to the sharehold-
ers of the target corporation. The only duty it owes at this point is to its
own shareholders to acquire the target as cheaply as possible. It would
be anomalous to hold that at the completion of the first-step tender, and
prior to the second-step merger, the acquiring corporation suddenly
owes a fiduciary duty to its former adversaries at the expense of its own
shareholders.
The inapplicability of Singer's "business purpose" and "entire
fairness" tests in the context of two-step acquisition has been noted by
commentators.15 2 Since it is the "business purpose" of the parent or
acquiring corporation that is at issue, 53 such "business purpose"
should be deemed inherent in two-step acquisitions-"[t]akeovers by
outsiders must be assumed to have a commercial goal that suffices by
itself to justify the transaction."' ' Further, in arguing against the ap-
plicability of "entire fairness" scrutiny, Brudney and Ohirelstein per-
suasively assert that:
[q]uite obviously . . . the two steps in the acquisi-
tion-tender offer plus merger-are integrated and represent
a "plan." The analogy to a unitary purchase of assets is
close and compelling. . . .Although the tag-end merger ap-
150 Tanzer, 379 A.2d at 1125.
' Martin Lipton notes that regrettably some courts have failed to observe the lack of fiduci-
ary duty in the outside offeror in a two-step acquisition and have indiscriminately applied entire
fairness scrutiny-often to provide plaintiffs with an alternative to the inadequacies of the ap-
praisal remedy. 1 M. LIPTON & E. STEINBERGER, TAKEOVERS AND FREEZEOUTS 46 (Supp. 1979).
152 Id., Restatement, supra note 28, at 1361. Also, in discussing U.S. Steel's takeover of Mar-
athon, one commentator asserted that "since the entire transaction was agreed to before U.S. Steel
became a Marathon shareholder, it is hard to find any basis for imposing a fiduciary standard of
any kind on U.S. Steel's conduct in implementing the merger on its negotiated terms. Nathan,
supra note 65, at 25, 32.
153 See supra note 149.
1I4 Restatement, supra note 28, at 1362.
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pears to be an example of self-dealing by the majority stock-
holders, it is only superficially of that class. Realistically, the
tender-plus-merger procedure is merely a way of bypassing
the target company's proxy machinery, which is controlled
by the incumbent board, and submitting the acquisition pro-
posal to direct referendum of the stockholders. . . . [T]he
subsequent merger merely gives effect to the majority's deci-
sion to accept the terms of the acquisition [described in the
tender offer announcement] ...
In these circumstances, there really is no transaction be-
tween related parties and no self-dealing whatever. The ac-
quiring company should be seen as an unrelated outsider
throughout the takeover-from the time the tender offer is
made to the time the merger is concluded. It has, or should
be held to have, no fiduciary obligation as such . . . . It has
no obligation to set a "fair" price for the target's property
and should have no duty to disclose its management plans or
to reveal any other values that it has discovered as an
outsider.15
B. Availability of Fair Appraisal Rights
1. The Problem with Existing Appraisal Statutes
It is conceded that two-tiered deals can be structured with a back
end so low as to be inherently unfair.15 The answer to this problem,
however, is not to regulate two-tiered deals out of existence; it is,
rather, to give target shareholders a remedy that will discourage offer-
ors from employing two-tiered offers in an abusive form. Because no
other federal or state remedies are available, shareholders must look to
their remaining remedy-statutory appraisal rights-when they are
faced with second-step consideration they deem unfair.
Appraisal rights provide shareholders dissenting from a merger
decision with the opportunity to receive a cash payment from the
merged company equal to the "fair value" of their shares.157 Appraisal
statutes, however, have been attacked as difficult to apply and unre-
sponsive to new forms of corporate transactions. The procedural re-
quirements necessary to comply with state appraisal statutes,5 ' the
' Id. at 1360-61.
164 See supra text accompanying notes 85-90.
167 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(h) (Cum. Supp. 1982); N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW
§ 623(h)(4) (McKinney 1982); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.85(C) (Page 1978).
16 Under Delaware law, for example, before a dissenting shareholder is entitled to receive
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burden of going through the appraisal process, and the difficulty in de-
termining "fair value" have led the appraisal remedy to be described as
"technical . . . expensive. . . uncertain in result, and, in the case of a
publicly held corporation . . . unlikely to produce a better result than
could have obtained on the market. . . . It is, in short, a remedy of
desperation .. ."I' These factors even discouraged some of the most
sophisticated shareholders of Marathon from pursuing their appraisal
rights under Ohio law.160
To provide a meaningful remedy, appraisal statutes must become
both more responsive to emerging new forms of corporate transactions
and easier for shareholders to invoke. This is especially true in the case
of a merger that forms the second step of a two-tiered deal. Appraisal
statutes often provide that "fair value" is to be determined "exclusive of
any element of value arising from the accomplishment or expectation of
the merger."16 In addition, although fair value of the shares is often
determined by taking a weighted average of their market value, invest-
ment value, and net asset value, market value is the primary factor if
there has been an active market in the acquired shares, sometimes to
the complete exclusion of the other two factors." 2 Some states go so
the cash provided under the appraisal statute, he must (a) file a written objection to the merger
prior to the shareholder meeting, (b) vote against the merger, (c) after the shareholder meeting
promptly give written notice to the corporation of his intent to pursue his appraisal remedy, and
(d) surrender his shares to the corporation. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(a)-(i) (Cum. Supp.
1982).
159 Eisenberg, The Legal Roles of Shareholders and Management in Modern Corporate De-
cision Making, 57 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 85 (1969).
160 After reportedly taking a position against the merger with U.S. Steel in order to preserve
its appraisal rights, Morgan Guaranty Trust, the sixth largest shareholder of Marathon, aban-
doned that position in view of the complexity of the appraisal process. Prudential Insurance Com-
pany, the fourth largest shareholder of Marathon, also considered pursuing its appraisal rights,
"but after studying Ohio's complex appraisal process, Prudential came to the same conclusions as
Morgan. . . ." Garson & Tyson, Morgan, Pr Switch on Marathon; Both Now Favor U.S. Steel
Merger, Am. Banker, March 11, 1982, at 10, col. 1.
161 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(h) (Cum. Supp. 1982). See also OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 1701.85(C) (Page 1978) ("In computing such fair cash value, any appreciation or depreciation
in market value resulting from the proposal submitted to the directors or to the shareholders shall
be excluded").
162 See Chazen, Fairness from a Financial Point of View in Acquisitions of Public Compa-
nies: Is "Third-Party Sale Value" the Appropriate Standard?, 36 BUS. LAW. 1439, 1444 (1981).
If the market value is unrealiable, the courts will give substantial weight to investment value,
which is obtained by capitalizing the company's earnings at the rate prevailing in the market for
similar companies. Net asset value is usually an important factor only in valuing corporations such
as natural resource and real estate companies, which are sometimes thought to be undervalued by
the stock market because they produce low reported earnings relative to their cash flow. Id.
A major argument of Marathon shareholders was their assertion that the $276 to $323 per
share net asset value of petroleum reserves, according to estimates in the Marathon Proxy State-
ment, supra note 6, at 13, should be weighted heavily in determining "fair cash value." Wall St.
J., Feb. 17, 1982, at 2, col. 3. A recent Delaware case held that net assets of natural resource
companies may be a factor to the extent those assets are held for appreciation and not merely as
raw material to produce a stream of future production earnings. Bell v. Kirby Lumber Corp., 413
A.2d 137 (Del. 1980).
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far as to make market value the conclusive test of value and eliminate
appraisal rights where the stock has a public market.""3 Further, states
often provide that fair value is to be measured as of the day immedi-
ately preceding the merger transaction. 1
These various requirements lead to a particularly unjust result
when applied to two-tiered offers. During the period after the first-step
tender offer and before the shareholder meeting to approve the second-
step merger, the market price will be fixed or "capped" by the pub-
lished value of the consideration to be offered in the second step. Thus,
by using the market value of the stock just prior to the merger and
excluding any value arising from the accomplishment of the merger, an
appraisal court would have to fix "fair value" at exactly the price at
which the acquiring corporation announced it would complete the sec-
ond-step merger. Dissenting shareholders, therefore, would gain noth-
ing by exercising their appraisal rights. To protect shareholders from
abusive two-tiered offers, it is necessary to reform existing appraisal
remedies.
2. Proposals to Reform Appraisal Statutes
Appraisal statutes should give courts great flexibility to take into
account the factors of value that have contemporary significance in
comparable business transactions, and exercising appraisal rights
should be less burdensome and less expensive to the unsophisticated
shareholder.
The recently adopted reform of the New York appraisal statute
goes a long way toward achieving these goals."6 5 The New York law
makes compliance less difficult for dissenting shareholders by requiring
only a single written notice of election to dissent."'8 The new law also
requires the acquiring corporation to make the dissenting shareholders
a written offer within fifteen days after the later of notice of dissent or
consummation of the merger at a price it considers to be "fAir value,"
and to accompany the writing with an advance payment of eighty per-
cent of the amount of such offer if the merger has been consum-
16" See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(k) (1975); N.J. REV. STAT. § 14A:11-
1(1)(a)(i)(A) (Supp. 1982); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1515L (Purdon 1982); MODEL BUS. CORP.
ACT § 80 (1971).
6 See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.85(C) (Page 1978).
165 1982 N.Y. Laws ch. 202.
1 N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 623(a), (c) (MeKinney 1982). This alleviates some of the bur-
den and confusion previously experienced by dissenting shareholders when they had to file a writ-
ten objection to the merger prior to the shareholder vote and then again give notice of an election
to dissent after the merger was authorized. Dual notice is still required in Delaware. See supra
note 158 and accompanying text.
FRONT-END LOADED TENDER OFFERS
mated.167 Thus, shareholders wishing to dissent will not be discouraged
by the prospect of waiting through a lengthy appraisal proceeding to
obtain any money.
Should either the corporation fail to make an offer or a share-
holder reject such offer, a court will then determine the fair value of the
shares.16 8 It is here, perhaps, that the New York law adopted the most
significant reform of appraisal law. The new law eliminated the statu-
tory language which excluded from the determination of fair value any
appreciation or depreciation induced by the merger. In determining fair
value, the appraisal court is now directed to ,consider
the nature of the transaction giving rise to the shareholder's
right to receive payment for shares and its effects on the cor-
poration and its shareholders, the concepts and methods then
customary in the relevant securities and financial markets for
determining fair value of shares of a corporation engaging in
a similar transaction under comparable circumstances and all
other relevant factors.1 69
This reform provides the necessary flexibility to deal with emerg-
ing acquisition techniques, and, particularly relevant to two-tiered
tender offers, it appropriately frees the appraisal court from the statu-
tory obligation of determining "fair value" primarily or conclusively by
reference to the market value of the shares just prior to the merger:170
The case law interpretation of fair value has not always re-
flected the reality of corporate business combinations. These
transactions involve the sale of the corporation as a whole,
and the corporation's value as an entirety may be substan-
tially in excess of the actual or hypothetical market price for
shares trading among investors. Thus, experience has
demonstrated that large premiums over market price are
commonplace in mergers and in asset acquisitions."1'
Thus, in determining fair value, the New York law permits the
appraisal judge to consider the increase in intrinsic value attributable to
the successful culmination of the first-step tender offer172 as well as the
167 N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 623(g) (McKinney 1982). The shareholder must first submit the
stock certificates for inspection and notation in accordance with § 623(0.
1- Id. § 623(h)(4).
169 Id. Further, the new law eliminates the unnecessary cost of an appraiser or referee and
provides that the court determine fair value without a jury. Id.
170 See supra notes 162-63 and accompanying text.
171 1982 N.Y. Laws ch. 202, § 1.
"' The step-up in intrinsic value following the tender offer, which was noted in Michael
Bradley's study, see supra notes 105-06 and accompanying text, will not be reflected in the market
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additional synergistic benefits to be gained by the consummation of the
second-step merger.1 M3 The new statute would also allow the judge to
apply what some commentators feel is the best measure of financial
fairness, "third-party sale value"-the price the acquired company's
shareholders would have received had the company been sold, as a
whole, to another unaffiliated purchaser.
17 4
The New York reform also provides an express statement of legis-
lative intent that, except where the corporate action is fraudulent or
unlawful as to the shareholder, a shareholder's right to dissent and re-
ceive fair value for his shares is his exclusive remedy.175 This limitation
is especially appropriate with respect to two-tiered offers. As dis-
cussed earlier,1 1  shareholders should not be permitted to invoke a
court's equity jurisdiction to enjoin a merger which fails to pass "entire
fairness" scrutiny; the offeror in a two-tiered deal is unrelated to the
target and thus owes no fiduciary duty to the target shareholders when
completing the second step merger.
17 7
Appraisal reform such as that adopted in New York is to be ap-
plauded. Provisions that serve to make appraisal less onerous and more
expeditious are likely to deter offerors from structuring two-tiered deals
with inappropriately low second-step consideration. Without an effec-
price of target shares in a two-tiered offer because the low second-step consideration, which was
announced when the entire two-step deal was proposed, will act as a ceiling or "cap" on the
market price. Thus, it is important that the appraisal judge be permitted to consider this step-up
in intrinsic value in the appraisal proceeding, rather than restrict his determination of fair value to
the market price prevailing just prior to the merger.
... As described by Chazen, supra note 162, at 1445, synergistic benefits include:
such things as the opportunity to eliminate duplicative operations, the possibility
that the stock market will apply a higher price earnings multiple to the company's
earnings when it is part of a larger enterprise than when it was independent and
the benefits the buyer obtains simply from having control of the company: protec-
tion against a takeover by a knave or a fool, and the ability to set business policy
and determine the timing of a sale of the business.
"" Id. at 1439. See also Chazen, Friedman, & Feuerstein, Premiums and Liquidation Val-
ues: Their Effect on Fairness of an Acequisition, in PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE, ELEVENTH AN-
NUAL INSTITUTE ON SEcURITIES REGULATION 143, 163 (1980), who state:
If [20 cases in 20 states] were fully litigated within the context of present invest-
ment banking thinking, and in the context of a stock market that for a number of
years has evaluated companies at about half of what they could be worth in a sale
context, 80 percent of the highest courts would hold that the banker has to give
substantial weight to the [third-party] sale value.
(statement by Martin Lipton).
'" 1982 N.Y. Laws ch. 202, § 1.
178 See supra notes 147-55 and accompanying text.
17 The New York reform rules out entire fairness scrutiny as well as other actions to enjoin
the merger except where the proposed transaction is fraudulent or unlawful as to the shareholder.
N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 623(k) (McKinney 1982). It is not likely that a mere allegation that the
two-tiered pricing constitutes a manipulative act under § 14(e) of the Securities Exchange Act, 15
U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1976), for example, would open the door to an alternative remedy under state
law.
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tive appraisal remedy, offerors may be tempted to try to lock out other
bids by financing an unusually high first-step offer at the expense of
the consideration promised in the second step. With an accessible ap-
praisal remedy that recognizes the typical step-up in intrinsic value of
target shares after a successful tender offer as well as flexible measures
of determining fair value, potential bidders will be deterred from struc-
turing two-tiered bids with second-step consideration less than the fair
appraisal value that is likely to be determined by the court.""8
IV. CONCLUSION
The two-tiered pricing structure is a strong tactical device to en-
able offerors to acquire 100% control of target corporations in two inte-
grated steps. The availability of the device, however, creates great po-
tential for abuse and its use has triggered shareholder claims of
manipulation, coercion, inherent unfairness, and breach of fiduciary
duties. Two-tiered offers should not, however, be regulated out of exis-
tence; rather, as this Comment suggests, reforms in the federal and
state laws that govern corporate takeover transactions would provide
sufficient safeguards against the noted concerns.
The recently adopted SEC rule 14d-8-requiring offerors to ac-
cept all shares tendered during the entire period of the offer on a pro
rata basis-goes a long way toward curing the defects in the prior ten-
day proration period, which often closed out unsophisticated investors
from the high first-step consideration and deprived other companies po-
tentially interested in the target of the time necessary to develop a strat-
egy and announce a competing bid. The SEC's authority to adopt rule
14d-8 can be questioned because Congress expressly rejected an essen-
178 This is not to imply that determining fair value will be simple or self-evident. Appraisal
statutes similar to that adopted in New York would not eliminate the battle of experts or the
judgmental nature of a valuation proceeding.
If, for example, an appraisal court accepted the theoretical relevance of the post-tender-offer
step-up in value that Michael Bradley reported, see supra notes 105-06 and accompanying text,
the application of such a factor would not always be straightforward. Bradley found, for example,
that after successful completion of a partial tender offer, target company shares were typically
valued 36% above the trading price prevailing prior to the offer. See supra text accompanying note
107. The trading price prevailing prior to an offer is not always stable. The trading price for
Marathon, for example, fluctuated from $53.90 to $78.00 in the three months prior to when the
bidding war between U.S. Steel and Mobil Oil began on October 30, 1981. (There seem to have
been two price run-ups in anticipation of a tender offer for Marathon. The first run-up immedi-
ately followed the July 2, 1981 announcement of a white knight agreement between Conoco and
Du Pont that foretold the defeat of the Mobil bid for Conoco. Conceivably, that news event trig-
gered speculation that Mobil or other firms might seek another oil company ripe for takeover,
such as Marathon. The second price run-up was in anticipation of the October 30, 1981 bid by
Mobil.) Therefore, an attempt to apply Bradley's typical 36% step-up in value to the range of
prices prevailing in the one to three months prior to October 30 would lead to a "fair value"
determination ranging from $67 to $109.
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tially identical statutory provision in 1968, but even if it is found that
the SEC did overstep its authority, the SEC could adopt a fifteen-day
proration rule which would provide similar investor protection and be
more in line with congressional intent. This Comment also argues that
two-tiered offers are not per se manipulative under section 14(e) of the
Securities Exchange Act, but recognizes that in some situations offers
structured with inadequately low second-step consideration may be
unlawful.
State law claims that equal consideration be paid in both steps, or
that the "entire fairness" and "business purpose" scrutiny developed in
Singer v. Magnavox7" be applied to enjoin the second step merger,
should be rejected. Rather, when there is no evidence of fraud, a dis-
senting shareholder's exclusive remedy should be his state law appraisal
rights. To make this right meaningful and responsive to two-tiered of-
fers as well as other emerging corporate takeover transactions, states
should follow the lead of New York in developing a statute which is
easy to comply with, provides dissenting shareholders with money up
front, and permits the appraisal judge to consider both the nature of the
transaction and current methods of measuring financial fairness used in
the securities and financial markets when determining the fair value of
the shares.
With adequate safeguards and remedies, the two-tiered tender of-
fer can be an effective tool in the mergers and acquisitions field. To bar
it completely would be to contravene the intent of the Congress that
regulation of tender offers favor neither the acquiring corporation nor
the target. So long as shareholders remain adequately protected, tender
offer techniques should be permitted to succeed or fail on their own,
not as a result of regulatory interference.
'79 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977).
